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I. INTRODUCTION 
Italy's shores bordering the Ionian Sea, particularly the seg-
ment joining Cape Spartivento to Cape Santa Maria di Leuca, form 
a coastline which is deeply indented and cut into. The Gulf of 
Taranto is the major indentation along the Ionian coast. The line 
joining the two points of the entrance of the Gulf (Alice Point-
Cape Santa Maria di Leuca) is approximately sixty nautical miles 
in length. At its mid-point, the line joining Alice Point to Cape Santa 
Maria di Leuca is approximately sixty-three nautical miles from the 
innermost low-water line of the Gulf of Taranto coast. 
The Gulf of Taranto is a juridical bay because it meets the semi-
circular test set up by Article 7(2) of the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.1 Indeed, the waters 
embodied by the Gulf cover an area larger than that of the semi-
circle whose diameter is the line Alice Point-Cape Santa Maria 
di Leuca (the line joining the mouth of the Gulf). 
On April 26, 1977, Italy enacted a Decree causing straight 
baselines to be drawn along the coastline of the Italian Peninsula.2 
A straight baseline, about sixty nautical miles long, was drawn along 
the entrance of the Gulf of Taranto between Cape Santa Maria di 
Leuca and Alice Point. The 1977 Decree justified the drawing of 
such a line by proclaiming the Gulf of Taranto an historic bay.3 The 
Decree, however, did not specify the grounds upon which the Gulf 
of Taranto was declared an historic bay. 
Even the report of the Commission which drafted the 1977 
• This article has been written in conjunction with a research project sponsored 
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1. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964) 
[hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea]. 
2. The Italian Decree of April 26, 1977 on straight baselines is reprinted in II 
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 147-51 (F. Durante & w. 
Rodino eds. 1979). 
3. See WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LA w OF THE SEA, supra note 2, 
art. 1 at 147-48. 
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Decree fails to mention the titles which might justify the proclama-
tion of the Gulf of Taranto as an historic bay. Instead, the report 
seems to imply that Italy has always exerted control over the Gulf 
by virtue of the Gulfs deep indentation into Italian territory.' 
Moreover, the Commission quotes previous examples of bays which 
have been enclosed since the Second World War, notwithstanding 
the fact that their mouths are wider than twenty-four nautical miles, 
the maximum length allowed for enclosing a juridical bay.5 
The relevant passage of the report, which is still unpublished, 
is worth quoting. After recalling Article 7(6) of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,6 the 
Commission proceeds as follows: 
The provision [Article 7(6)] does not make it clear what is meant 
by historic bay; neither does an examination of legal literature or 
the present practice of States give sufficient elements for a definite 
conclusion. 
It is true that the historic bay is defined in the literature of 
international law as one over which the coastal State can claim 
to have exercised exclusive rights over a considerable length of 
time; the classical examples usually cited are the Chaleur, 
Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, among others. However the 
examples are not exhaustive and it is evident that when the coasts 
of a bay belong to only one State, that State will normally have 
control over it. 
The examples of enclosed bays with an entrance more than 
24 nautical miles in width which must therefore be considered as 
"historic", are legion. Some examples are Peter the Great Bay, 
enclosed by the Soviet Union in 1957, the Gulf of Gabes enclosed 
by Tunisia, all the enormously wide-entranced bays on the River 
Plate enclosed by Argentina and Uraguay in 1966, all the Egyptian 
bays and gulfs closed by Egypt in 1951, all the bays of Gabon 
enclosed in 1966 and 1968, the bays of Guinea enclosed in 1964, 
and the Bay of Ungwana closed by Kenya in 1960, the Panama 
Gulf closed by Panama in 1956 etc.7 
Clearly, the notion of an historic bay is highly controversial. 
In fact, at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
4. Report of the Commission on Straight Baselines (1977) (unpublished document of 
the Italian Government). 
5. Id. 
6. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1, art. 7(6). 
7. See Report of the Commission on Straight Baselines, supra note 4. 
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Sea the participating states were not able to reach a viable defini-
tion. However, it must be recognized that the notion of an historic 
bay is linked with a time element. It is a time element which is 
reflected by both the exercise of sovereign rights over the bay by 
the coastal state and the acquiescence, or at least the toleration 
of third states.8 This premise based on time brings one closer to 
ascertaining whether the Gulf of Taranto meets with the criteria 
defining an historic bay. The following analysis illustrates this point. 
Since the notion of an historic bay is linked with the element 
of time, one must first ascertain whether Italy has effectively 
exercised exclusive rights over the Gulf of Taranto, without 
challenge by third states, for a considerable period of time. The 
length of time proposed for this discussion (in relation to both the 
exercise of sovereignty by the coastal state and the practice of 
interested states) is that from the proclamation of the Kingdom of 
Italy in 1861, to the present day. This period will be divided into 
four segments: (1) from 1861 to the entry into force of the Italian 
Code of Navigation (1861-1942); (2) from 1942 to August 14, 1974, 
and the enactment of the Law amending Article 2 of the Italian 
Code of Navigation to extend the Italian territorial sea to twelve 
nautical miles (1942-1974); (3) from the 1974 Law amending the 
Italian Code of Navigation to the 1977 Decree which ·proclaimed 
the Gulf of Taranto an historic bay (1974-1977); and (4) from the entry 
into force of the 1977 Decree to the present (1977-1985).9 
II. THE GULF OF TARANTO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. 1861-1942 
During this period Italy did not establish a consistent distance 
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. The extension of 
8. Goldie, Historic Bays in International Law: An Impressionistic Overview 11 SYR. 
J. INT'L L. & COM. 211 (1984). 
9. It is unnecessary to trace the status of the Gulf of Taranto back before the pro-
clamation of the Kingdom of Italy (1861), since the length of time that will be scrutinized 
is fairly extensive. It is worth noting, however, that at the time of the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies, the Kingdom's territorial sea was measured according to the custom of the cannon 
shot rule. A bay could be closed only if the body of water thus enclosed met the requisites 
of the cannon shot rule. No exception was made for the Gulf of Taranto, which was men-
tioned only as a mere geographical expression and not as an example of an historic bay. 
See C.M. MOSCHETTI, I IL CODICE MARITTIMO DEL 1871 DI MICHELE DE JORIO PER IL REGNO DI 
NAPOLI: INTRODUZIONE E TESTO ANNOTATI 229 (Giannini ed.1979): C.M. MOSCHETTI II IL CODICE 
MARITTIMO DEL 1871 DI MICHELE DE JORIO PER IL REGNO DI NAPOLI: INTRODUZIONE E TESTO AN-
NOTATI 612 (Giannini ed. 1979). 
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the territorial sea varied according to the terms of legislation in 
effect at any given time. For example, Act No. 16 of 16 June 
1912-which enacted rules on the passage of merchant ships 
through Italian coastal waters- fixed the breadth of the territorial 
sea at ten miles.10 The Royal Decree of 6 August 1914 (No. 798) on 
the rights and duties of the neutral powers in wartime established 
a six mile territorial sea limit.11 Curiously enough, customs laws 
of January 26, 1896, employed the kilometer and not the nautical 
mile as the unit for measuring the territorial sea. The limit was 
thus established at the kilometers equivalent of 10 nautical miles.12 
None of the above laws quote the Gulf of Taranto as an historic 
bay. Even the Decree of 13 June 1915 (No. 899) set up no special 
proviso for the Gulf of Taranto.13 For security reasons, the latter 
Decree prohibited, inter alia, anchoring and stopping of foreign mer-
chant ships in the Italian territorial waters of the Ionian Sea, 
between Santa Maria di Leuca and Capo Passero.14 The territorial 
sea, however, remained at ten miles according to the Law of 16 June 
1912 (No. 612).15 The same considerations apply to the Neutrality 
10. See WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LA w OF THE SEA, supra note 2, 
at 1. Cf Pagliano, Mare Territoriale e Transito Inoffensivo (A proposito di un recente disegno 
di legge), 5 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (RIV. DIR. INT.) 551 (1910). 
11. Sandiford, fl Mare Territoriale Secondo il Diritto Positivo Italiano, RIVISTA 
MARITTIMA, (Apr. 1927) at 89. 
12. Id. at 94. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. See SIOI-CNR, III LA PRASS! ITALIANA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE SECONDA SERIE 
(1887-1918) 1379-82 (1979). Article 4 of the June 13, 1915 Decree prohibited any nightime 
fishing activities in the territorial waters of the Ionian Sea. 160 GAZ. UFF. ITAL. (June 26, 
1915) at 3983. The Decree of Aug. 24, 1915 (No. 1312) added further restrictions forbidding 
navigation in the waters within the line between Cape Trionto and Torre Madonna dell'Alto. 
220 GAZ. UFF. ITAL. (Sept. 4, 1915) at 5216. Whether during the day or night, fishing in the 
waters lying landward of the line joining Cape Trianto and Cape Santa Maria di Leuca was 
also prohibited. Both lines enclosed a body of water which fell far outside the limit of the 
territorial sea. However, the wording of the August 24, 1915 Decree does not make it clear 
whether the prohibitions applied only to Italian vessels or those of foreign nationals as well. 
However, the former view seems to be the correct view to be inferred from other Italian 
wartime Decrees. For instance, the Decree of December 23, 1915, (No. 1880) 6 GAZ. UFF. 
ITAL. (Jan.10, 1916) at 127, extended the prohibition set up by the Decree of August 24, 1915 
to the waters landward of the line Cape Trionto-Fiumara Assi. Since the local fisherman 
could be compensated for the loss they met in observing the prohibition, one can argue that 
it applied only to Italian vessels. In fact, the terms "ships flying any flag" - and not those 
of ships of any type as in Decree No. 1312-would have been employed, had the Italian law 
covered both Italian and foreign vessels. See Decree of July 11, 1915, (No. 1000) 168 GAZ. 
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Law of July 8, 1938.16 That law also did not embody any particular 
rule for the Gulf of Taranto, notwithstanding the practice of neutral 
powers to extend the limit of their territorial waters to impede 
hostilities from occurring in proximity of their coasts. 
Legal writers similarly did not include the Gulf of Taranto 
among historic bays. In the 1937 issue of the "Rivista del diritto 
della navigazione," R. Ago published an article on the limits of Italy's 
territorial sea.17 He did not make any mention of the Gulf of 
Taranto.18 Even G. Cansacchi and R. Sandiford, who devoted special 
attention to the problem of the delimitation of the territorial sea, 
failed to include the Gulf of Taranto among their list of recognized 
historic bays.19 The same is true for earlier writers such as P. 
Fedozzi20 or P. Fiore.21 In the French edition of his manual, P. Fiore 
listed the Gulf of La Spezia as an historic bay, but he omitted the 
Gulf of Taranto.22 The Gulf of Taranto is listed as an example of 
an historic bay only by the French writer De Cussy. 23 
It is worth noting that the problem of historic bays was dealt 
with at the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of Interna-
tional Law.2' However, the Italian Government, unlike other delega-
tions, did not make any proposal nor did it claim the territoriality 
of the Gulf of Taranto.25 
UFF. ITAL. (July 6, 1915) at 4134, bearing on navigation through the Adriatic Sea and the 
blockade of the Adriatic coast. 
16. See WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LA w OF THE SEA.supra note 2, 
at 15. 
17. Ago, Sui Limiti del Mare Territorial.e, 3 RIVISTA DEL DIRITTO DELLA NAVIGAZIONE 
(RIV. DR. NAV.) 370 (1937). 
18. Id. 
19. Sandiford, supra note 11, at 79; G. CANSACCHI, L'OcCUPAZIONE DEi MARI COSTIERI, 
CRITICA DI UNA DOTTRINA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 234 (1936). 
20. P. FEDOZZI, I CORSO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE, INTRODUZIONE I 359 (1930). 
21. P. FIORE, Nuovo DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBLICO SECONDO I BISONGI DELLA CIVIL TA 
MODERNA 174-75 (1865). 
22. P. FIORE, NOUVEAU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SUIVANT LES BESOINS DE LA CIVILISA-
TION MODERNE 374 (P. Pradie-Fodere trans. 1868). 
23. DE Cussv, PHASES ET CAUSES CELEBRES DU DROIT MARITIME DES NATIONS 97-98 (1856). 
On the other hand, the Gulf of Taranto is not listed as an historic bay by T. ORTOLAN, REGLES 
INTERNATIONALES ET DIPLOMATIE DE LA MER 151 (4th ed. 1864). 
24. League of Nations: Acts of the Conference for the Codification of International 
Law: Territorial Waters, III Minutes of the Second Committee, League of Nations Doc. 
C. 351(b) M. 145(b) V (1930) [hereinafter cited as Hague Conference of 1930). 
25. The Italian representative limited himself to proposing the appointment of a special 
committee to study the problem of historic bays. Hague Conference of 1930, supra note 24, 
at 112-13. 
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B. 1942-1974 
In 1942, Italy enacted her Code of Navigation, establishing a 
unitary limit for the territorial sea. According to Article 2, the 
territorial sea is fixed at six miles.26 This is the same proviso which 
established that bays, the entrance to which is no more than twenty 
miles, were to be regarded as falling under Italian sovereignty.27 
The last line of Article 2 established that both the six and the 
twenty mile limit could be derogated for special purposes by other 
laws or regulations.28 Since that time, however, the Gulf of Taranto 
has not been the object of any such particular law or regulation. 
It is well known that the United Nations Secretariat prepared 
two studies on historic bays. The first was part of the material sub-
mitted to the First Conference on the Law of the Sea;29 the second 
was commissioned by the Conference, after the delegations failed 
to reach a suitable definition of an historic bay.30 Both studies con-
tain a list of historic bays. Neither, however, includes the Gulf of 
Taranto.31 This is perhaps due to the fact that no claim was ever 
made by the Italian government over the Gulf, nor was any pro-
posal made to the U .N. Secretariat to include the Gulf of Taranto 
under the category of historic bays. 
The legal doctrine of the period under review also makes no 
mention of the Gulf among the examples of historic bays. Many 
examples are found in the manuals of two learned Italian authors 
who devoted extensive attention to the problem of the Law of the 
Sea and to the question of historic waters: G. Ballad ore Pallieri and 
R. Quadri.32 There are also two monographic studies: The Regime 
of Bays in International Law (1964) by the Dutch scholar L.J. 
Bouchez and Il Regime Giuridico delle Baie e dei Golfi (1970) by the 
Italian author F. Lauria. Obviously, these latter two books cite many 
26. Article 2 of the Italian Code of Navigation, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS 
LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA, 
ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (1957), at 162. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See Historic Bays: Memorandum by the Secretariat of the United Nations, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 13/l, reprinted in I UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
OFFICIAL RECORDS 3 (1958) [hereinafter cited as I UNCLOS OFFICIAL RECORDS (1958)). 
30. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143, 
reprinted in (1962) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1. 
31. See supra notes 29-30. 
32. G. BALLADORE PALLIERI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBLICO 425 (8th ed. 1962); R. 
QUADRI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBLICO 673 (5th ed. 1968). 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1984], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss2/4
1984] Gulf of Taranto 281 
examples of historic bays.33 Neither, however, mentions the Gulf 
of Taranto. 
c. 1974-1977 
The Italian Law of 14 August 1974 (No. 359) amended Article 
2 of the Code of Navigation in order to extend the breadth of the 
territorial sea to twelve miles and to proclaim Italian sovereignty 
over those gulfs or bays whose entrance was no more than twenty-
four miles.34 This law, however, does not embody any particular 
proclamation concerning the Gulf of Taranto. The Gulf of Taranto 
is mentioned by B. Conforti in the first edition of his manual.35 Con-
forti also rejects the territoriality of the Gulf, and concedes that 
it might be closed only under the principle of reciprocity.38 This lat-
ter principle refers to states, such as Libya, which have resorted 
to enclosing bays without having a valid title.37 
D. 1977-1985 
As previously stated, the 1977 Italian Decree proclaimed the 
Gulf of Taranto as an historic bay.38 The following elements of state 
practice support the Italian claim. First, after the enactment of 
Decree No. 816, Italy gave due publicity to the new baseline system, 
including the enclosure of the Gulf of Taranto. A chart on which 
the baselines were shown, as well as the Decree, were notified to 
the states members of the international community. Besides this, 
every port authority of the Mediterranean was duly informed by 
the Ministry of Merchant Navy of the new delimitation of the Italian 
territorial sea. No one challenged the enclosure of the Gulf of Taran-
to. Further evidence is this statement by the Minister of Defense 
before the Italian Parliament in 1982: "[t]he 1977 Italian decision 
to consider as internal waters the waters of the Gulf of Taranto 
has neither been challenged or questioned by any State."39 
33. See L.J. BOUCHEZ, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LA w (1964); F. LAURIA, IL 
REGIME GIURIDICO DELLE BAIE E DEi GOLFI (1970). 
34. See WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LA w OF THE SEA, supra note 2, 
at 115. 
35. See B. CONFORTI, APPUNTI DELLE LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 219-20 (1976). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
39. See Atti Parliamentari, Camera dei Deputati, VII Legislatura-Discussioni-Seduta 
del 5 Marzo 1982, No. 474 RESOCONTO STENOGRAFICO 25 (1982). The statement by Italy's 
Defense Minister was delivered at the time of the Italian Parliament debate over the intru-
sion of a Soviet submarine into the Gulf of Taranto. See Ronzitti, Sommergibli non Iden-
tificati, Pretese Baie Storiche e Contromisure dello Stato Costiero, 66 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO IN-
TERNAZIONALE (RIV. DIR. INT.) 5 (1983). 
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Second, on August 24, 1977, Italy and Greece concluded an 
agreement for the delimitation of the continental shelf.'° Regarding 
apportionment, the agreement applies the median line principle. 
Since every point of the line must be equidistant from the nearest 
points on the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured, the median line between Italy and Greece was drawn 
by taking into account the new baseline along the Ionian coast. 
Third, on February 24, 1982, a Soviet submarine intruded into 
the Gulf of Taranto. A similar intrusion took place on August 30 
of the same year. The Italian Navy tried to intercept the submarine 
and Italy protested to the Soviet Union. The Soviet response, how-
ever, did not challenge the Italian claim over the Gulf of Taranto. 
Rather, the Soviets only claimed that the intruders had not been 
Soviet vessels.41 
Fourth, in 1981, Lord Kenneth asked whether the United 
Kingdom or NATO recognized the Gulf of Taranto "as Italian 
internal or historic waters."'2 In his reply, the Foreign Secretary, 
Lord Carrington, stated as follows: "Italy claims the Gulf of Taranto 
as internal waters. This is not consistent with our interpretation 
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea. NATO does 
not take a position on the territorial sea limits of its members.''43 
No protest, however, was conveyed by the United Kingdom to Italy, 
nor did the United Kingdom challenge in any other way the 
enclosure of the Gulf of Taranto. 
III. AN INTERIM EVALUATION OF THE ITALIAN-CLAIM 
An historical evaluation and assessment of state practice leads 
to the following interim conclusion. The enclosure of the Gulf of 
Taranto as an historic bay has met a considerable degree of 
acquiescence by third states. This is particularly true if w~ com-
pare the Gulf of Taranto with other recent enclosures such as that 
of the Gulf of Sirte, which raised protest from many states and was 
challenged twice by the U.S. Navy." 
In effect, Italy began to claim sovereign rights over the Gulf 
of Taranto only after the entry into force of the 1977 Decree. Before 
40. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE. BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, 
No. 96 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LIMITS IN THE SEAS]. 
41. Both incidents are discussed at Ronzitti, supra note 39. 
42. 424 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 368 (1981), 
43. Id. 
44. See Francioni, The Gulf of Sirte Incident (U.S. v. Libya) and International Law, 5 
ITALIAN Y .B. INT'L L. 85, 99 (1980-81); Spinnato, Historic and Vital Bays: An Analysis of Libya's 
Claim to the Gulf of Sidra, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 65 (1983). See also infra text accompany-
ing note 66. 
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this date it is not possible to trace any significant sign of Italian 
sovereignty over the Gulf. The same is true . for legal writers, since 
no one, with the single exception of the French author De Cussy,'5 
regarded the Gulf as an historic bay. It is worth pointing out, 
however, that shortly before the enactment of the 1977 Decree, Italy 
had amended the 1942 Code of Navigation by extending the outer 
limit of its territorial waters and had proclaimed Italian sovereignty 
over those bays whose entrances were no more than twenty-four 
miles in length. 
It has been rightly pointed out that the 197 4 Law amending 
the Code of Navigation excludes, by implication, the territoriality 
of the Gulf.'6 Had the 1974 Law held that the Gulf was an historic 
bay, Italy would still have not made any such proclamation for 
another three years. Legal writers who have commented on the 
1977 Decree (with the exception of M. Giuliano)'7 hold that the Gulf 
of Taranto cannot be classified as an historic bay.'8 On the basis 
of the foregoing, therefore, must one conclude that the enclosure 
of the Gulf of Taranto is unlawful? 
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE PRACTICE 
Before addressing this assertion, it must be ascertained 
whether the enclosure under review can be justified under a dif-
ferent theory. In the first place, there must be an examination of 
whether the norm on historic bays has changed. More specifically, 
there must be regard to recent challenges concerning the need for 
coastal states to exercise exclusive rights over a long period of time 
in order to qualify a bay as "historic." 
According to one view, since the entry into force of the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone,'9 practice demonstrates how states have enclosed bays without 
undue thought to proving the existence of historic roots for the titles 
45. See DE CussY, supra note 23, at 94-98. 
46. Adam, Un Nuovo Provvedimento in Materia di Linee di Base del Mare Territorial,e 
Italiano, 62 RIV. DIR. INT. 479 (1978). 
47. Giuliano, Quali Sono i Veri Limiti dell.e Acque territoriali, L'UNITA (Sept.13, 1982) 
at 4. The Gulf is also considered an historic bay by Fontana, Le Linee di Base del Mare Ter-
ritorial.e Italiano, 111 RIVISTA MARITTIMA 78-79 (1978); Bastianelli & Francalanci, Il Diritto 
Internazional.e del Maree la Delimitazione della Piattaforma Continental.eltaliana, AGENDA 
NAUTICA 11, 18 (1980). The latter do not give a clear indication of the historic titles upon which 
the Italian claim is based. 
48. See, e.g., B. CONFORTI, LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 193 (2d ed.1982); Fusillo, 
3 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 570, 574-75 (1977); Adam, supra note 46, at 479-80; L. MIGLIORINO, FONDI 
MARINI ED ARMI DI DISTRUZIONE DI MASSA 68 (1980); Francioni, supra note 44, at 99. 
49. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1. 
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claimed.50 These states have justified their enclosures by underlin-
ing economic and defense interests. 51 In other words, according to 
this theory, state practice has transformed the norm on historic 
bays, so that their existence is no longer tied to the exercise of 
exclusive rights by the coastal states over a long period of time. 
The application of this theory to the Gulf of Taranto has led one 
Italian legal writer to the following conclusions: "Whilst the. 
classification of the Gulf of Taranto as a historic bay cannot be con-
sidered as lawful on the basis of the trends prevailing when the 
Geneva Convention was adopted, nevertheless it appears to form 
part of the current development in practice."52 
This theory, suggesting that the notion of an historic bay 
embodied by Article 7(6) of the Geneva Convention has undergone 
a radical change, is faulty on two counts. In the first place, Article 
10(6) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea58 is 
drafted using the identical wording as Article 7(6) of the 1958 
Geneva Convention. sc Both provisions fail to define the notion of 
an historic bay. However, it must not be overlooked that when 
Article 7(6) of the 1958 Geneva Convention was drafted, the drafters. 
had in mind the traditional notion of an historic bay. 55 Had the 
drafters intended a different meaning for the expression "historic 
bay" than the one prevalent in 1958, they would certainly have made 
it clear; they would have made the content of Article 10(6) different. 
In fact, the opinions expressed at the Third Conference on the Law 
of the Sea were so varied on the subject of historic bays that no 
agreement over a definition was possible.58 Nonetheless the requisite 
of prolonged exercise of exclusive rights by the territorial sovereign 
was always present in the proposals put forward for the definition 
of an historic bay, albeit some states did underline the elements 
50. See, e.g., T. KOBAYASHI, THE ANGLO-NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE OF 1951 AND THE 
CHANGING LAW OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 18-19, 32, 57-58 (Univ. Florida Monographs 1965). 
51. See T. KOBAYASHI, supra note 50. 
52. Fusillo, supra note 48, at 575. For a discussion of the theory to which the customary 
norm on historic bays has been changed, see T. KOBAYASHI, supra note 50. 
53. See Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 10(6), <Ypenedfor 
signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. AiCONF .62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21I.L.M.1261, 1272 
(1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention). 
54. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1, art. 7(6). 
55. This may be inferred from the two studies on historic bays drafted by the United 
Nations Secretary General, supra• notes 29-30. 
56. See M. Nordquist, A Textual History and Commentary on the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Draft Articles 72 
(1980) (unpublished diss~rt.ation U. Va. Sch. L.). 
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of defense of the coastal state as a justification for the territoriality 
of their bays. 57 
In the second place, although state practice immediately 
preceeding and following the 1958 Geneva Convention shows that 
numerous states did not "mince words" when claiming the ter-
ritoriality of a bay, it must be remembered that their behaviour 
raised protests from third states. For example, on July 21, 1957, 
the Soviet Union established, by Decree, the enclosure of the Bay 
of Peter the Great.58 The Soviet Decree caused the United States, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and Sweden to protest.59 Some of these 
states poin~ed out that the Soviet Union could not claim historic 
title and, furthermore, that Soviet arguments based on economic 
and defense requirements could not form a valid title for claiming 
the territoriality of the Bay.60 
Similarly, in 1961 Uruguay and Argentina enclosed the estuary 
of the River Plate.81 The United Kingdom and the United States 
protested, claiming among other things that the enclosure could 
not be justified by Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention.82 In 
1973 Libya enclosed the Gulf of Sirte.88 Among the protesting States 
were the United States and Italy." As is widely known, the United 
States did not merely send a note of protest,86 but passed through 
the Gulf with a naval squadron. And, in August 1981, the United 
States even carried out · military exercises in the waters claimed 
by Libya, with the purpose of demonstrating that the Libyan claims 
were without legal ground. 88 Italy also. challenged the Libyan 
enclosure on the occasion of the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between Malta and Libya. 87 Italy, before the International Court 
of Justice, said that she was "unable to accept" Libya's claims over 
the Gulf of Sirte.88 
57. See c. 2/Blue Paper No. 1 (24 Mar. 1975) reprinted in IV THIRD UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON THE LA w OF THE SEA: DoCUMENTS 121 (PlatzOder ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited 
as IV Platzoder); c. 2/Blue Paper No. 3/ Rev. 1 (9 Apr. 1975) reprinted in id. at 125. 
58. L. J. BOUCHEZ, supra note 33, at 224-26; Whiteman, IV DIG. INT'L L. 250-58 (1965). 
59. See L.J. BoucHEZ, supra note 35, at 225-26; Whiteman, supra note 58, at 251-58. 
60. See Whiteman, supra note 58. 
61. See L.J. BOUCHEZ, supra note 33, at 165. 
62. Id. at 165. 
63. See A. W. ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 293-94 
(1974). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. During the exercises, two Libyan aircraft were shot down. For comments on the 
incident see Francioni, supra note 44, at 85; Spinnato, supra note 44, at 65. 
67. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta). Doc. CR 84/1, at 43. 
68. See id. For the Italian protest after the Gulf of Sirte enclosure, see the statement 
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V. THE THEORY OF VITAL BAYS 
Unconvincing, too, is the theory that a new norm of customary 
international law has come into existence regarding historic bays 
beside that embodied in both Article 7(6) of the 1958 Convention69 
and Article 10(6) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea.70 This new norm, it is claimed, admits the lawfulness of 
the enclosure of a bay where the coastal state can claim particular 
economic and defense interests.71 If we are to accept this theory 
(better known as the "theory of vital bays"12) the closure of the Gulf 
of Taranto would be justified, since strategic needs are far from 
indifferent here, due to the presence in the Gulf of one of Italy's 
most important naval bases. Nonetheless, the vital bay theory has 
absolutely no legal ground in international law, as the following con-
siderations will confirm. 
The doctrine of vital bays is not in any way new, and was not 
formulated by states born from the process of decolonization dur-
ing the 1960's, as it has been suggested.73 It was first stated by Cap-
tain Storni in 1922, on the occasion of the 31st Conference of the 
International Law Association.74 Storni suggested that a state could 
claim the territoriality of a bay in the following two cases: (a) when 
there was "un usage continu et seculaire" or (b) "dans les cas ou 
les precedents n'existeraient pas ... [the occupation of a bay derives · 
from] une necessite ineluctable."75 Among the possible necessities 
mentioned by Storni were "les necessites de defense."76 Storni's idea 
was taken up by Portugal at the time of the 1930 Hague Conference 
on the Codification of International Law.77 The Portuguese represen-
tative pointed out that "if certain States have essential needs ... 
those needs are as worthy of respect as usage itself, or even more 
so."78 
Nonetheless, the doctrine of vital bays did not meet with sup-
of Mr. Bensi, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, before the Italian Parliament on July 8, 
1974. He recalled all the representations made by the Italian Government at the time of 
the enclosure. Statement of Mr. Bensi, 2 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 422-23 (1976). 
69. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, SU]Wa note l, art. 7(6). 
70. 1982 Convention, SU]Wa note 53, art. 10(6). 
71. See Francioni, SU]Wa note 44, at 98-100. 
72. Id. at 98. 
73. See II INTERNATIONAL LA w ASSOCIATION: REPORT OF THE 31ST CONFERENCE 95 (Buenos 
Aires 1922). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. See Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, su]Wa note 29, at 20. 
78. Id. at 20, para. 18. 
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port in the decisions of the international tribunals. As long ago as 
1917, the Central American Court of Justice, in rendering a deci-
sion on the status of the Gulf of Fonseca, confirmed that it was 
necessary to examine the characteristics of the bay "from the 
threefold point of view of history, geography and the vital interests 
of the surrounding States."79 Therefore, although the Court men-
tioned the "vital" interests of the state, it did not omit considera-
tion of historic titles. Likewise, in the 1951 Fisheries Case between 
Norway and the United Kingdom, the International Court of Justice 
concluded that Norway's interests had to be taken into account. 
In the Fisheries Case, these interests were not identified with 
defense but with economic necessities. 80 The Court, however, also 
underlined how "the reality and importance" of these interests were 
"clearly evidenced by a long usage."81 
Writers on the subject have made similar observations. In point 
of fact, as Y .Z. Blum rightly observes: 
the so-called 'vital interests' of the coastal State, taken in isola-
tion, do not appear to have been recognized in the past as a suffi-
cient ground for the acquisition of an historic title, and were relied 
upon only in conjunction with all the other considerations which, 
through their combination, warrant the inference of an interna-
tional acquiescence. 82 
Blum's observations are confirmed by recent practice of states in 
the enclosure of bays or gulfs with an entrance exceeding twenty-
four nautical miles, as well as by what transpired from the Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. For example, when Libya 
enclosed the Gulf of Sirte she claimed that it was "crucial to the 
security of the Libyan Arab Republic."83 Nonetheless, this Mediter-
ranean state did not fail to underline that "through history and 
without any dispute, the Libyan Arab Republic has exercised its 
sovereignty over the Gulf."84 
Although the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea con-
79. Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law: The Re'JfUblic of El 
Salvador v. The Republic of Nicaragua (Central American Court of Justice 1917), 11 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 67 4, 700 (1917). 
80. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 l.C.J. 116, 133 (Judgment of Dec. 18, 1951). 
81. Id. 
82. Y.Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (1965). 
83. UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES 
RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA, Doc. No. ST/LEG/SER.B/18, at 26 (1976) [hereinafter cited 
as UNITED NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE SERIES (1976)). 
84. Id. See Rousseau, Chroni,que des Faits lnternationaux, 18 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R. G. DR. INT. P.) 1096, 1177-78 (1974). 
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eluded by repeating Article 7(6) of the 1958 Geneva Convention,85 
it does emerge from the works that no autonomous proposal was 
made regarding the institution of vital bays. The Columbian pro-
posal on historic bays gives full consideration to the traditional doc-
trine, anchored as it is to the prolonged exercise of rights by the 
coastal states, and the acquiescence of third states, without ever 
referring to vital interests.88 Whenever reference was made to "vital 
interests" within the working committee of the Third Conference 
(whether for defense or economic purposes), such interests were 
never considered in isolation from exclusive rights having been 
exercised for "a long" or a "considerable period of time."87 In other 
words, the vital interests of coastal states- such as defense or 
economic motives - can in fact be the basis of a claim to exercise 
exclusive rights. Only, however, if this exercise has been for "a long" 
time, and meets with the acquiescence of third ·states, does the title 
come into existence. 
VI. DRAWING STRAIGHT BASELINES IN JURIDICAL 
BAYS 
There remains a third way of determining whether the 
enclosure of the Gulf of Taranto is lawful. It consists of examining 
whether the closing line can be considered a segment of a straight 
baseline drawn along the whole coastline of the Ionian Sea, under 
Article 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention.88 In order to do this, it 
is first necessary to ascertain whether in juridical bays (such as 
the Gulf of Taranto) with an entrance exceeding twenty-four nautical 
miles, the coastal state is allowed only to draw a straight baseline 
within the bay, according to Article 7(5), or whether it can choose 
to draw a longer straight baseline, under Article 4. If the answer 
is the latter, it will be necessary to ask whether the closing line 
of the Gulf meets the requisites set forth by Article 4. 
In order to answer the first question, Articles 4 and 7 must 
be read together, because vis-d-vis Article 4, Article 7 is 'lex specialis 
entitling the coastal state to draw a straight baseline, even if the 
crite~ia set forth by Article 4(1) are not met. In those places where 
85. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1, art. 7(6); (1982 Conven-
tion, supra note 53, art. 1066). 
86. Draft Articles Concerning the Territorial Sea: Bays the Coasts of Which Belong 
to a Single State, Historic Bays or Historic Waters, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/c. 2/L.9, reprint,ed 
in V. THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICIAL DoCUMENTS 202 
(1976) (hereinafter cited as V UNCLOS Ill OFFICIAL RECORDS (1976)). 
87. See IV PlatzOder, supra note 57, at 121, 125. 
88. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1, art. 4. 
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the coast is flat- that is, where it is not deeply indented or cut 
into- the coastal state is entitled to enclose a bay if its entrance 
is not more than twenty-four nautical miles across, and the bay 
meets the semi-circle test. The coastal state is not only entitled to 
draw a straight baseline, although the bay penetrates a flat 
coastline, it is also entitled to draw the line without meeting the 
requirements established in Article 4(2). 
If the inlet should happen to be a juridical bay, in that it meets 
the semi-circle test, but has an entrance exceeding twenty-four 
nautical miles, Article 7 embodies another special proviso vis-d-vis 
Article 4. 89 The coastal state may draw a straight baseline of twenty-
four nautical miles in length within the bay, although it penetrates 
a flat coastline and the straight baseline does not meet the 
requirements of Article 4(2). Article 7, however, does not ,set forth 
that a coastal state is necessarily required to observe the specifica-
tions outlined herein if it wishes to draw a straight baseline. Even 
when the inlet is a juridical bay, the state can draw a straight 
baseline according to the criteria established in Article 4(2), if the 
inlet penetrates a coast deeply indented and cut into. If this were 
not so, the exception embodied in Article 7(6), according to which 
the provisions set forth for legal bays would not apply where a 
straight baseline is drawn in accordance with the system established 
by Article 4, would not have any practical meaning. 
It is clear that a coastal state with a coastline which is deeply 
indented and cut into will prefer to apply Article 4 rather than 
Article 7 if the juridical bay has an entrance exceeding twenty-four 
nautical miles. In point of fact, by applying Article 4 the state can 
close the whole mouth in such a way that the enclosure takes the 
form of a segment of the longer straight baseline which is drawn 
along the coastline. This choice, however, does require a price to 
be paid: if a straight baseline is drawn within the bay under Arti-
cle 7, the coastal state is free to adopt a straight baseline of twenty-
four nautical miles, even when the closing line does not meet the 
conditions laid down in Article 4(2). Furthermore, the waters of the 
bay lying landward of the baseline will be subject to the usual 
regime of internal waters.90 On the other hand, if the state intends 
89. Id. art. 7. 
90. Article 7(4) sets forth that the waters within the straight baseline drawn across 
a bay "shall be considered as internal waters." Id. art. 7(4). Since this proviso does not con-
tain any reservation (it is not said that art. 5(2) must be applied), the waters within the 
bay are "genuine" internal waters. where the right of innocent passage is no longer in force. 
See L.J. BoucHEZ, supra note 33, at 109-10. 
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to close the whole bay, the straight baseline will have to meet the 
requirements set forth by Article 4(2). In this -ca.se Article 5(2) will 
also apply, requiring the coastal state to grant the tight -of inno-
cent passage in those internal waters which formerly were subject 
to either the regime of territorial waters or that of the high sea. 
The interpretation of the relationship between Articles 4 and 
7 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea suggested 
here is supported by the opinion of a learned authority9' and is con-
firmed by the Convention, as well as by state practice. It must not 
be overlooked, on the subject of the travaux preparatoires, what 
the legal expert of the Secretariat of the Geneva Conference, Pr.o-
fessor Fran~ois, explicitly stated to be the object of the exception 
embodied in Article 7(4) Oater Article 7(6)) on straight baselines: 
It covered [stated Fran~ois] the possibility that certain coasts to 
which the straight baseline system might be applied contained 
bays; in that case the straight baseline would have to be drawn 
in such a way as to include- the entire bay in the area of internal 
waters. In short, the International Law Commission has considered 
that, should a straight baseline be drawn covering the coast of the 
bay, the special rules relating to bays would no longer be 
applicable.92 
This statement by Professor Fran~ois was approved by Denmark,93 
and an amendment whereby the exception on historic bays was to 
be maintained and the second exception to Article 7 (concerning 
eases where the straight baseline system is adopted) was to be 
deleted, was withdrawn by the United Kingdom.94 
Regarding state practice, one must recall the instances of 
enclosing juridical bays with entrances wider than twenty-four 
nautical miles, according to the straight baseline system, which were 
carried out after the entry into force of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea. Madagascar has closed the Bay of Antongil with 
a 25.9 mile long line.96 Portugual has drawn a line 31.25 miles long 
from Caho Espiehel and Caho de Sines to enclose the inlet into which 
the Sado River flows.96 This could be a juridical bay if the waters 
91. Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8 INT'L 
& COMP. L.Q. 73, 78-85 (1959). 
92. u .N. Doc. A/CO NF. 13/39, reprinted in III UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LA w 
OF THE SEA OFFICIAL RECORDS 147, para. 1 (1958) [hereinafter cited as III UNCLOS OFFICIAL 
RECORDS (1958)). 
93. Id. at 147, para. 2. 
94. Id. at 147, para. 3. 
95. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 15 (1970). 
96. Id. 
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of the Sado estuary are included.97 The conduct of the Australian 
Government is also illuminating. In a statement delivered on 
October 31, 1967, regarding policy over the enclosure of Australian 
bays, Mr. Bowen, Commonwealth Attorney-General, stated as 
follows: 
The Convention [the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone] authorizes the drawing of straight 
baselines up to 24 miles in length across bays that meet the criteria 
specified in the Convention, and the Government has decided to 
apply this principle wherever relevant, around the coasts of 
Australia and of the Territories. Three deep indentations around 
the Australian coast-Shark Bay, St. Vincent Gulf and Spencer 
Gulf- all of which are "bays" under the criteria specified in the 
Convention would not be completely enclosed by baselines 24 miles 
in length. Shark Bay, at least, is probably already under Australian 
sovereignty as an "historic" bay. But in any event the Convention 
authorizes the drawing of straight baselines exceeding 24 miles 
in length, where a coastline is deeply indented or cut into, pro-
vided that no appreciable departure from the general direction of 
the coast is involved. Straight baselines will accordingly be drawn 
across the entrances to Shark Bay and the two South Australian 
Gulfs."98 
VII. THE GULF OF TARANTO CLOSING LINE AS A 
SEGMENT OF THE STRAIGHT BASELINE DRAWN 
ALONG THE IONIAN COAST 
Once it has been established that a state is entitled to enclose 
a juridical bay under Article 4, providing it penetrates a coast that 
is deeply indented and cut into, it must be ascertained whether the 
closing line of the Gulf of Taranto conforms to the criteria set forth 
in this proviso. It is important as well to remember that the line 
enclosing the Gulf of Taranto can be regarded as a segment of the 
longer straight baseline which is about 154 nautical miles long and 
which covers a deeply indented coast with six segments. 
It is beyond all doubt that three of these segments (Alice 
Point-Mouth of the River Neto; Mouth of the River Neto-
Northern Cape Colonna; Southern Cape Colonna-Cape Cimiti), 
which are all short, do meet the prescriptions of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention. Clearly, they do not depart from the general direction 
of the coast, as a glance at the charts will show. The same can be 
97. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 27 (1970). 
98. Mr. Bowen's statement is quoted by Edeson, The Validity of Australia's Possible 
Maritime Historic Claims in International Law, 48 AUSTL. L. J. 295, 297 (1974). 
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said for the segment from the Allaro Mouth to 37 56' .75-16 05' 
.45 (near Cape Spartivento), although the straight baseline in this 
instance is rather · longer than the others. This author is of the 
opinion that the Cape Rizzuto- Stilaro Mouth (right bank) segment, 
which closes the Gulf of Squillace, does not depart to any appreciable 
extent from the general direction of the coast and encloses a 
relatively small body of water. In short, this Gulf has been closed 
according to the 1958 Geneva Convention, and is recognized even 
by those who expressed grave doubts as to the conformity of the 
Geneva Convention to the system of straight baselines adopted by 
Italy under Decree No. 816 (1977).99 The problem arises over the 
segment closing the Gulf of Taranto, which is about 60 miles long, 
and which joins the two extremities of the Gulf with a diagonal line. 
This enclosure subjects a considerable body of water to the regime 
of "internal waters," although it does recede on the western side. 
It must not be overlooked that Article 4(2) of the Geneva Con-
vention sets forth two criteria which must be met when drawing 
a straight baseline or a segment: (a) the· baseline "must not depart 
to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast;" 
and (b) "the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently 
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of 
internal waters."100 Criterion (a), which is in agreement with that 
established by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries 
Case, 101 does not set forth precise limits regarding the length of 
baselines.102 Rather, it is important because it states that the 
baseline should not depart to any appreciable extent from the 
general direction of the coast.103 The Convention, however, does not 
indicate any meaning for the phrase "the general direction of the 
coast." It is, however, reasonable to suppose that "the general direc-
tion of the coast" in a gulf or bay is represented by the entrance 
points of the inlet, or by those promontories closest to the entrance. 
If this were not so, the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
would not have chosen "the general direction of the coast" as a stan-
99. See Adam, supra note 48, at 474. 
100. Article 4(4) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone enables the coastal state to take into account "in determining particular 
baselines, [the] economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and impor-
tance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage." 1958 Convention on the Territorial 
Sea, supra note 1, art. 4(4). However, it seems that this method of territorial sea delimita-
tion is not particularly relevant for the Gulf of Taranto, even if one considers the interests 
based on fisheries exploitation. See Adam, supra note 46, at 486. 
101. Fisheries Case, supra note 80. 
102. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 91, at 77. 
103. Id. 
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dard, but rather would have chosen sinuosity instead.104 If our 
premise on the notion of "the general direction of the coast" is cor-
rect, it follows that the baseline for the Gulf of Taranto does not 
depart from "the general direction of the coast" to any appreciable 
extent. On the contrary, the baseline follows "the general direc-
tion of the coast" and even recedes inward towards the West. This 
is because instead of drawing a line from Cape Santa Maria di Leuca 
to Cape Colonna, Italy has drawn it from Cape Santa Maria di Leuca 
to Alice Point. 
After the entry into force of the 1958 Geneva Convention,105 
state practice shows how the criterion prohibiting departure to any 
appreciable extent from "the general direction of the coast" has 
been interpreted much more freely than it has been by the Italian 
legislature. Suffice it to mention a few examples regarding the 
enclosure of gulfs which can be classified as neither juridical bays 
nor claimed as historic bays by the coastal states. Apart from the 
rather peculiar case of Guinea, which drew a straight baseline of 
120 nautical miles, 106 there are many other precedents. When Ireland 
'set forth her system of straight baselines, under the 1929 Maritime 
Jurisdiction Act, 107 she drew two segments exceeding twenty-four 
nautical miles in length. These closed the Bay of Cork (24.25 miles) 
and the Bay of Durgavan (25.20 miles).108 In 1967, Mauritania drew 
a straight baseline of eighty-nine nautical miles, enclosing the Banc 
d'Arguin.109 At its furthest point the baseline is 34.2 miles off the 
coast. In 1968, Venezuela enclosed the Gulf of the Orinoco River 
by a baseline of 98.9 nautical miles.110 Similarly, Haiti enclosed the 
Gulf of Gonave, which has an entrance of ninety-five nautical miles. 
The central point of this latter closing line is about fourty nautical 
miles from the coast.m Finally, in 1972, Iceland drew a system of 
straight baselines with segments which in some points diverge quite 
clearly from the general direction of the coastline. An example is 
104. See generally, T. GIHL, The Baseline of the Territorial Sea, in SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES 
IN LAW 121 (1967); Cf. D.H.N. Johnson who writes that baselines drawn across well-defined 
bays must be presumed to "follow the general direction of the coast." Johnson, The Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 168 (1952). 
105. See 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1. 
106. See LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 40 (1972). 
107. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 37 (1970). 
108. Id. 
109. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 8 (1970). 
110. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 21 (1970). 
111. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 31 (1970). 
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the line joining Geirfuglasker and Eldeyardrangur, which is 70.30 
nautical miles.112 
The second criterion which a straight baseline must meet sets 
forth that "the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently 
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of 
internal waters."113 This is a largely tautological criterion,114 bor-
rowed from the judgment of the International Court of Justice in 
the Fisheries Case115 and repeated word for word by Article 7(3) of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.116 Although 
this criterion agrees with the former in restricting the freedom of 
the coastal state, it is not easy to give it a precise significant mean-
ing. In point of fact, if the waters lie within the baselines, they are, 
by definition, internal waters. 
Two points are raised by the second criterion embodied in 
Article 4(2). These two points are similar to those on which the rule 
on the enclosure of juridical bays is grounded.117 The first cir-
cumstance is connected with the appurtenance of the waters within 
the baseline with the land domain. This is a purely geographical 
consideration, proven by the fact that landward waters are lying 
within the general direction of the coast. The general direction of 
the coast in the Gulf of Taranto is determined by an ideal line from 
Cape Santa Maria di Leuca to Cape Colonna. Therefore, since a seg-
ment enclosing the bay has been drawn from Cape Santa Maria di 
Leuca to Alice Point (which falls within the western side, as has 
already been observed), there can be no doubt that the body of 
waters within the baseline are lying within the general direction 
of the coast. 
The second circumstance concerns the reasonableness of the 
enclosure. This must be assessed in relation to both the change in 
the regime of the waters which takes place because of enclosure, 
and to the interests of the coastal state and third states. In the 
first place, the navigation interests of third states are to be con-
sidered. The importance of the internal waters of the Gulf of 
Taranto as a highway of international communication is nil. This 
112. LIMITS IN THE SEAS, supra note 40, No. 34 (1974). 
113. 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note l, art. 4(2). 
114. See, e.g., Nordquist, supra note 56, at 43. 
115. Fisheries Case, supra note 80, at 133. 
116. 1982 Convention, supra note 53, art. 7(3). 
117. See Evensen, The Angw-Norwegian Fisheries Case and Its Legal Consequences, 46 
AM. J. INT'L L. 609, 622 (1952); Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court 
of Justice, 1951-1954: Points of Substantive Law-I: Maritime Law, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 
406-08 (1954); cf. McDoUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 333-36 (1962); Edeson, 
Australian Bays, 4 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1968-69). 
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is due to the fact that shipping coming from the Sicilian Canal and 
bound for the Adriatic or the Aegean Sea (and vice versa) does not 
have to cross it-entry into the waters of the Gulf would only waste 
time. Nevertheless, should it be deemed necessary, or even only 
preferable to enter the Gulf, the regime of innocent passage would 
apply. 
Second, the interests of third states, which in this case are 
scarcely noticeable, should be weighed against those of the coastal 
state, which are much more substantial. The most important is the 
necessity of defense, more so than economic considerations.118 The 
former made it impossible to delay the enclosure of the Gulf. For 
example, military exercises outside territorialwaters but in prox-
imity of the coast could represent an opportunity for planning 
strategies in the event of armed conflict. The simple entry and 
stoppage of foreign war vessels, whether ships or submarines, could 
enable an accurate assessment of coastal defense, and even the plac-
ing of military devices. Unless the coastal state can take measures 
to preclude a~y such activity, its safety is in peril. It is beyond all 
doubt that the enclosure of the Gulf of Taranto has the object of 
ensuring Italian defense. One only has to remember that one of the 
largest naval bases vital for Italian defense, the strategy of the 
NATO southern flank, and Italy's military commitments under the 
treaty which binds Italy to guarantee Malta's neutrality,119 lies 
within this bay. Furthermore, the shelter offered by the Ionian 
coast, could enable foreign warships or submarines to loiter in the 
entrance of the ·Gulf interfering with Italian peacetime military 
exercises. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Whereas the characterization of the Gulf of Taranto as an 
historic bay under Decree No. 816 (1977) is open to contest, it is 
beyond all doubt that the baseline enclosing the entrance to this 
bay is in compliance with Article 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Territorial Sea.120 It follows that the waters within the 
118. As a matter of fact, Italy may acquire exclusive rights over fisheries by the pro-
clamation of an EEZ off the Ionian coast without enclosing the Gulf of Taranto with a system 
of straight baselines. · 
119. See the exchange of notes between Italy and Malta of September 15, 1980 which 
is discussed in, Ronzitti, Malta's Permanent Neutrality, 5 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L . .171 (1980-81); 
Ronzitti, Lo Scambio di Note Tra Italia e Malta del 15Settembre1980 e i Problemi di Diritto 
Internazionale SoUevati Dagli Aspetti Militari del Sistema di Garnzia deUa Neutralit4 Maltese, 
in SCRJTTI JN MEMORJA DI DoMENICA BARILLARO 471 (1982). 
120. SBe 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 1, art. 4. 
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baseline are internal waters, where the rig~t of innocent passage 
must be granted according to Article 5(2) of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention.121 This regime applies to the waters of the Gulf that 
were high seas before the enclosure, as well as to those which had 
the status of territorial waters before the entry into force of Decree 
No. 816 (1977). Since previous to this the baseline of the Gulf was 
the low-water mark, this means that in practice the whole body of 
the waters of the Gulf is subject to the regime of innocent passage. 
While innocent passage can be exercised, overflying the Gulrs 
super-adjacent waters is not permitted. In fact, Article 5(2) of the 
1958 Geneva Convention122 mentions the right of innocent passage 
in relation only to waters which before the drawing of straight 
baselines had the status of territorial or internal waters. Therefore, 
as far as the overflight regime is concerned, the status of the waters 
of the Gulf of Taranto is equated to that of territorial waters in toto. 
Although the closing line of the Gulf of Taranto can be justified 
under Article 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention,128 there is nothing 
to impede the straight baseline being lawful under a different 
theory. That theory is the "historic bays doctrine," provided that 
the process which is at present underway lasts long enough to give 
birth to an historic title. The 1977 Presidential Decree124 may be 
regarded as the starting point of such a process which will reach 
its conclusion only when Italy has exercised exclusive rights over 
the Gulf of Taranto without protests and with the acquiescence of 
third states. 
Finally, practice shows that Italy's exercise of sovereignty over 
the Gulf of Taranto has continued without interruption. Italy 
asserted its exclusive rights at the time of the Soviet submarine 
intrusion. No one, until now, has challenged the Italian claim, not 
even the United Kingdom, since Lord Carrington's reply before the 
House of Lords is only a parliamentary statement and cannot be 
regarded as a true act of protest. Moreover, the new straight 
baseline was accepted by Greece at the time of the 1977 Italo-Greek 
Treaty on the delimitation of the Continental shelf between the two 
countries.125 
121. See id. art. 5(2). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. art. 4. 
124. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
125. Id. 
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